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Nelson Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1984), pp. 200. Reviewed by Thomas Patrick Rardin, 
Appalachian State University. 
Of Mind and Other Matters is principally a work in the development 
and application of Nelson Goodman's epistemology. The book does meet 
the challenge it sets for itself: that is, to provide a sense of unity to an 
epistemology which is broadly conceived as philosophy of the 
understanding. Specifically, the challenge is to provide a coherent 
conceptual framework for an epistemology which embraces the 
philosophy of science, the philosophy of art, and a relativism so radical 
that "the world" gives way to a pluralism in which multiple worlds are 
created under the stress of equally correct but conflicting ways of 
describing, picturing, and perceiving it. Accordingly, what makes this book 
an important philosophical work is that Goodman's general theory of 
symbols (developed earlier in languages of Art) emerges as a coherent 
framework in which the ways of world making in the sciences and the arts 
are embraced in a philosophy of the understanding. 
One cannot avoid noticing the behavioristic orientation of Goodman's 
treatment of cognition. It is in connection with this orientation that the 
centrality of his theory of symbols begins to emerge. Following the lead of 
John B. Watson, Goodman focuses on the activities and states involved in 
thinking in order to render thought accessible to scientific observation. 
But under Goodman's conception of cognition, thinking involves a variety 
of symbolic forms. Thinking in' must be interpreted broadly enough to 
include thinking in pictures and other symbols as well as thinking in words. 
In order to accommodate such diversity in the forms of thought, Goodman 
argues that the states and processes involved in thinking must be 
understood in terms of preparations for producing, judging, and 
perceiving symbols of all kinds. 
Goodman is careful not to suggest a reduction of the mental to the 
physical, and he warns against confusing the forms of thought with either 
the forms of the processes and states or the forms of the systems in which 
thinking occurs. Nevertheless, he makes it clear that his theory of symbols 
is to play an integral role in the development of a theory of the forms of 
thought. As he states, "The forms of processes and states pertaining to 
readiness to produce or judge or perceive a symbol are in many respects 
determined by the syntactic and semantic form of the systems that the 
symbols to be produced or judged or perceived belong to; for instance, 
thinking In characters of a notational system involves activities and states 
differing in form from those that thinking in ordinary language or in 
pictures involves" (pp. 27-8). 
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It is not until Goodman considers the consequences of his relativism 
for "the world" about which we think that the centrality of his theory of 
symbols is fully realized. Goodman presents his commitment to a radical 
relativism as his response to the fact that some truths do conflict. Since 
there are conflicting true versions which cannot without paradox be true in 
the same world, he concludes that they are true in different worlds. For 
Goodman, nothing short of a commitment to multiple worlds is required in 
order to avoid accepting a single world in which all versions are true and 
the distinction between truth and falsity is lost. But not only does 
Goodman argue that there exists a world for each conflicting true version, 
he stresses that each true version actually creates its world. This follows, 
Goodman explains, from the feet that there is "no true version compatible 
with all true versions" (p. 33). According to Goodman, all that there is, is a 
product or construct of some true version. 
Even though Goodman maintains that worlds are the constructs of 
right versions (of which true versions are a species), he does not claim that 
a right version is identical with the world it creates. He points out that a 
version will be In some symbol system or other and will, accordingly, have 
some features that the world it creates will lack. Nevertheless, Goodman 
maintains that the dependency of a world on its version may be traced to 
the form of the symbol system in which the version is right. As Goodman 
states: "And the forms of what we think of are by no means independent of 
the forms of what we think in. The form of classical music heard is affected 
and constrained by the structure of the notation in which the score is 
written. And I maintain that a world, much like a musical performance, is 
the creature of and is Informed by a version constructed in a symbol 
system" (p. 28). 
It is, then, out of a relation of dependence which Goodman's theory of 
symbols emerges as a foundation for his epistemology. He argues that 
both the forms of thought and the forms of the worlds about which we 
think are dependent on the forms of the symbol systems in which we think. 
But Goodman also demonstrates that his theory of symbols actually 
provides a coherent framework for his epistemology. He does so by 
providing an analysis of the forms of reference employed in the various 
symbol systems whose versions make our worlds. It proceeds as follows. 
The term 'reference' is taken as a primitive term and is explained to cover 
all sorts of symbolization usually taken to be cases of "standing for" (p. 55). 
The elementary and complex forms of reference frequently employed in 
the sciences and the arts are then explicated in terms of the syntactic and 
semantic form of the systems in which they occur. The forms of reference 
considered include: literal verbal denotation, notation, pictorial 
denotation, quotation, exemplification, Active denotation, figurative or 
metaphorical denotation, expression, and allusion. 
Indeed, Goodman successfully demonstrates the centrality of his 
theory of symbols and its ability to unify an epistemology which he broadly 
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conceives as a philosophy of the understanding. On this score alone, Of 
Mind and Other Matters Is a valuable work in philosophy. Yet, Goodman's 
concerns are not confined to theory. He is also concerned with 
applications of his epistemology. Turning to literary theory, Goodman 
provides a lucid analysis of narrative discourse and realism. In a 
discussion of art education, he makes a number of impelling 
recommendations for reform, some of which concern museum 
management. 
One shortcoming of the book arises in connection with Goodman's 
inquiry into the standards of tightness of versions. Truth is discussed at 
length, but "truth as rightness of what is said is a narrow species of 
lightness" (p. 39). Truth is rightness of literal verbal denotation. The 
standards of rightness of pictorial denotation, exemplification, etc., are 
barely mentioned. This is disappointing especially since Goodman clearly 
Identifies the broader inquiry as "one of the most pressing problems of 
present-day philosophy, and one of the most perplexing" (p. 14). 
Of Mind and Other Matters is a work of considerable breadth. This 
review has considered only a few of the concerns addressed in it. The 
value of the book is that Goodman successfully relates those concerns to 
his general theory of symbols. The result is a unified epistemology in 
which both the arts and the sciences participate in informing the 
understanding by employing symbol systems which contribute to the 
forms of thought and the forms of the worlds about which we think. 
Whether you are familiar with Goodman's work or not, I strongly 
recommend reading the book. 
Manuscript Essays and Notes in The Works of William James, ed. by 
Fredrick H. Burkhardt. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988. 550 
pages. $50.00. And Manuscript Lectures in The Works of William 
James, ed. by Frederick H. Burkhardt. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1988. 686 pages. $70.00 Reviewed by Stephen A. Kennett, Southern 
Illinois University, Carbondale. 
Manuscript Essays and Notes and Manuscript Lectures are the final 
two volumes in the nineteen volumes of The Works of William James 
published by Harvard University Press under the auspices of Fredrick H. 
Burkhardt, General Editor. Beginning in 1973 the American Council of 
Learned Societies sponsored The Works of William James for a National 
Endowment for the Humanities grant Max H. Fisch, Eugene T. Long, John 
J. McDermott and H. S. Thayer constituted an Advisory Board that 
established general policy and were consulted on substantive problems in 
the editorial process. The works in this series are edited according to the 
standards of the Center for Scholarly Editions of the Modern Language 
Association of America. 
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The final volumes of this series bring to a close a monumental project 
that in conjunction with the Southern Illinois University's Dewey project, 
the University of Chicago's Royce series, and the new editions of Peirce 
and Santayana provide a firm foundation for a reassessment of the 
classical American philosopher's contributions to the mission of 
philosophy in general. With the planned future publication of The 
Correspondence of William James, under the general direction of John J. 
McDermott, sound and definitive editions are becoming available for 
James research and ancillary American studies. 
No fault can be found with the excellent critical apparatus contained 
in both Manuscript Lectures and Manuscript Essays and Notes. 
Emendations and alterations to manuscripts are exhaustively cataloged 
and explained. Also, the indexes are thorough and the introductions more 
than helpful. In fact, the introductions to both volumes, written by Ignas K. 
Skrupskelis, Associate Editor of the James works and James bibliographer, 
are Invaluable. They offer over one hundred pages of exegetlcal and 
evaluative information about the contents of the volumes. Skrupskelis 
weaves together the seemingly separate strands of public lectures, 
fragmentary course outlines and incomplete manuscripts into an 
understandable and admirable whole cloth. 
Manuscripts Essays and Notes includes James's works in progress on 
philosophical and psychological subjects. By far, the manuscript that will 
garner the most interest will be James's The Many and the One" written 
from 1903 to 1904. James hoped this book would explain his philosophy of 
radical empiricism for a technical, that is professional, philosophical 
audience. The manuscript offers explanations and discussions not found 
in James's published works. 
The Many and the One" occupied James from the middle of July 1903 
to the middle of July 1904. After promising to issue a systematic volume on 
his philo'sophical views in his preface to The WQl to Believe, and urged in 
fact to write the book by such reviewers as F. C. S. Schiller, James found 
little time to devote to the work because of the demands of lecturing and 
the writing of short essays. James's completion of the work was also 
inhibited by growing frustration over the project which is clearly revealed 
in his proposed motto for the book-a quotation from Melville's Moby 
Dick: "God help thee, old man, thy thoughts have created a creature in 
thee; and he whose intense thinking thus makes him a Prometheus; a 
vulture feeds upon that heart for ever; that vulture the very creature he 
creates." (Introduction, xix) 
The title. The Many and the One," immediately shows the character 
of the manuscript and Its author. As a transposition of the usual phrase, 
"the one and the many," the title emphasizes the importance of pluralism 
in James's thought. This is followed closely by a qualifier 
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"The moment of Experience" Is what I should have called it (the 
book), if I had thrust into the foreground the second aspect of my 
picture, of which I next make mention. How, on the supposition 
that the manyness of things precedes their unity, does any unity 
come into being at all? (6) 
And here is the perennial rub, that most basic of all philosophical 
problems—How does pluralism achieve unity and how does monism 
explain diversity? James's pluralism is united in "the continuity, the 
absolute nextness of one part to another which we find in the minutest 
portions of our inner experiences." (6) 
However, "The Many and the One" contains some extremely puzzling 
notions that must have contributed to James's unwillingness to complete 
the book. For example, Section 5 of the manuscript is a discussion of the 
concept of pure experience: "A philosophy of pure experience can admit 
no 'matter' except that which some subject of experience shall perceive or 
think. The matter is there only for that subject. Conversely it can admit no 
'mind* not given in correlation with some material or immaterial 'object' 
which is felt or thought." (21) Hence, for James, the difference between a 
subject and an object is found in their functions assigned from our 
reflection of the experience and are not found in the immediate stuff 
composing the experience. He uses this concept of experience as the 
unity of a pluralistic universe. James explains in his marvelous style: 
If the world be made of the stuff of experience, then it must be 
experienced throughout, just as everything in a picture must be 
painted, and everything in a story must be told. The picture, it is 
true, needs a canvass, and the words need a tongue, & so some 
philosophers have thought that experiences also need substantial 
supports. But as painted fishes can live in a painted sea, and a 
storied palace hold a storied king & court, even so experience 
connexions are sufficient fasteners together of experienced 
terms, and transitions realized by us are the only relations 
possible between such things as our experiences grasp. (23) 
And it is this experience that James names radical empiricism. 
The seamlessness of pure experience is proved by the psychology of 
perception, as found in the Principles of Psychology. James thought that 
"the fusion of an incoming impression with a mass of resident ideas that 
apperceive it" could not be separated into its discrete parts. Again he 
gives a wonderful explanation of this fusion: 
As in those great circular Panoramas, views of foreign places or of 
battles, which have of late been exhibited in our cities, the real 
earth & grass and cannon of the foreground connect themselves 
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so subtly with their continuations on the painted canvass, that it is 
impossible to part them, and the whole scene shares in the effect 
of reality; so in a percept it Is impossible to say what share of the 
thing before our eyes comes from the outer world and what our 
own mind's memories contribute. (31) 
Other concepts James wrestles with in The Many and the One" include 
Idealism, pragmatism, analysis of possibility and a discussion of necessity. 
Yet, the manuscript is incomplete and at times consists of random notes 
that are either repetitive or sketchy and incoherent. There may be several 
reasons for this lack of completeness but one should not overlook the fact 
that it may be due to James's philosophical outlook. Maybe James's 
inability to complete his proposed magnum opus, The Many and the 
One," resides in his theme of fallibilism, that is, that all assertions are open 
to revision. In no case is this clearer than in James's position on radical 
empiricism. 
It is generally admitted that in the question of fact argument can 
lead to but probable conclusions. The pattern of construction of 
the universe is, after all, a question of fact, and it is quite enough 
for the dignity of a system of philosophy if, without pretending to 
invulnerable certainty, it succeeds in giving to the hypothesis for 
which it argues a supreme, or even a superior degree of 
persuasiveness. Such a superior persuasiveness is all that I aspire 
to, and probability for my conclusions is all that I shall claim. (4) 
Such an attitude as expressed by James's fallibilism would make any 
conclusive and final work, like a magnum opus, an impossible task. 
The only other material in these two volumes that will be of sustained 
interest for James scholars will be his notebooks on the objections raised 
by Dickinson Sergeant Miller and Boyd Henry Bode to radical 
empiricism. The Miller-Bode objections summarily described argue that 
James's philosophy of pure experience was incapable of answering the 
fundamental problem of the many and the one. His notebooks reveal his 
construction of radical empiricism as a response to these conundrums and 
as a rejection of the dualities Inherent in modern philosophy. 
The other philosophical essays in this volume revolve around 
discussions of idealism and the meaning of truth. They will be of little 
research value. The psychology sections will be of little interest except to 
the historian and the biographer. However, "The Many and the One," the 
Miller-Bode notebooks, and Skrupskelis' introduction are worth the 
investment in Manuscript Essays and Notes for the serious James scholar. 
All other scholars will find the earlier volumes in this series a richer field of 
study, as they contain most of the pertinent miscellanea of the topic 
covered by the individual volume. 
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Manuscript Lectures consists of James's public lectures and his 
lecture notes from the various courses he taught at Harvard from 1872 to 
1907. The public lectures start with the John Hopkins Lectures on The 
Senses and the Brain and Their Relation to Thought," of 1878, the Lowell 
Lectures on The Brain and the Mind," of 1878, and concluded with his 
notes of addresses to graduate clubs from 1902 to 1906. James's teaching 
career was closely tied to the presidency of Charles William Eliot, who 
transformed the school from a traditional college to a modern university. 
Nowhere was this reformation more evident than in the philosophy 
curriculum. Eliot insured that academic freedoms were securely in place 
which allowed the teaching of evolution and Herbert Spencer, two of 
James's favorite topics. This freedom allowed James to pursue his interest 
and expand his knowledge of philosophy through his teaching duties. In 
such a tolerant atmosphere the philosophy department expanded its 
offerings from five courses in 1872-73 to twenty-seven courses in 1906-7, the 
last year of James's teaching. Furthermore, the philosophy teaching staff 
included such luminaries as James, Royce, Santayana and Ralph Barton 
Perry, and the psychology program was taught by Hugo Mttnstenberg, 
Edwin Bissell Holt, and Robert Mearns Yerkes. James flourished in this 
atmosphere. 
Skrupskells again gives an excellent introduction to this volume. As 
with James's actual lecture notes, Skrupskells' introduction is a wealth of 
information that will be of interest to the biographer and historian, 
especially those interested in a time of rapid change at Harvard. However, 
there is little here to offer other James scholars. The lectures tend to be 
cryptic short phrases interspersed with paragraphs of complete lucid 
notes. A point of contention I have with this volume is that some of the 
lecture notes included seem to be superseded by later drafts of the same 
lecture. Hence, there is too much redundance in the lecture notes. For 
example, "Notes for a Lecture in The Physiological Effects of Alcohol"" 
(1886) includes two separate sections of notes, the actual draft of the 
lecture, and then an outline of the lecture. It would seem that much dead 
wood could have been dispensed with if the notes and maybe also the 
outline would have been left out. Overall, I cannot recommend this 
volume, except to the historian and biographer. For philosophical 
research, some of the earlier volumes in this series would be a much better 
investment, along with Manuscript Essays and Notes. 
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Rfidiger Bubner. Essays in Hermeneutica and Critical Theory. 
Translated by Eric Matthews. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. 
Hardcover, pp. 262 + viii. Reviewed by Martin J. Matustik, Fordham 
University. 
f. General review. Buhner's eight essays record two developments: first, 
an intellectual history of the last twenty years (German originals were 
published between 1971-1984) in hermeneutics, critical theory, and the 
Anglo-American philosophy of science; second, Buhner's mediation of 
critical theory and hermeneutics through the mean of practical 
philosophy. What Bubner says about young Hegel in his Frankfurt and 
Jena periods discloses Buhner's aspirations to reconcile Hegel and 
Aristotle: "(Hie wanted...to bring together Kant and Aristotle. He therefore 
had to answer the question of the compatibility of practically applied 
reason and reality of political practice..." (205). 
But Buhner's journey away from Hegel—from hermeneutics and 
critical theory to the immediacy of practical philosophy—Is ambiguous. In 
the last essay, Bubner warns against the type of reconstructive science 
envisioned, e.g., by Habermas: "The writer of history must, of course, be on 
his guard against the specialist's temptation to confuse reconstruction with 
reality" (231). The preface gives a Hegelian twist to Buhner's self-
interpretation: the present volume reconstructs the problems that 
emerged in Buhner's life and marks the shift from the context of 
investigation to historical practices that generate contexts, from method to 
substantial issues, from the two strands of the philosophy of reflection-
Gadamerian receptive hermeneutics and forward-looking critical theory— 
to radically contingent reason in action and history, (vii-viii) The book 
moves from Hegel only to come closer to Hegel's shadow. 
Buhner's ambiguous journey allows for two different readings of his 
text First, one could strengthen his concern with history, finitude, and the 
sophistic deception expressed in the Gorgias and push him in the 
direction of radical hermeneutics and deconstructlon in the style of 
Caputo and Derrida.1 This reading would make Buhner's case against 
idealism, functionalism and communicative ethics more angular, but it 
would also undermine his "good" will to discourse against the deceptive 
will to power.2 Second, one could present Habermas' communicative 
1Cf. 20, 22, 34, 48, 113,165-70,173,187,189,192. Compare this possible 
reading of Bubner with John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: 
Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1987). 
2cf. 87, 150, 153f., 173. Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer, 
editors, Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter 
(Albany, the SUNY Press, 1989). 
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more comprehensive and successful mediation of theory and practice 
than Buhner's but also as a rebuttal of deconstruction to which Bubner 
leaves himself open.3 
The movement from method to action in history divides Buhner's 
collection into two asymmetrical parts. The first five essays follow the 
methodological debates of the early 70s—dialectics with positivism, 
phenomenology with Marxism, the Hegelian-Marxist tradition with the 
post-empirical philosophy of science, critical theory with the philosophies 
of the lifeworld. The last three essays take up the issues of practical 
philosophy, action, and reason in history. 
//. Essays in or beyond kermeneutics and critical theory? 
1. "What Is Critical Theory?" (1971, pp. 1-35) examines that self-
overcoming of ideological interests which is effected by critical theory's 
own resources. Bubner shows how the aporias of self-grounding reappear 
in Horkheimer's "unconcluded dialectic" which freed itself from the quest 
for the absolute standpoint. Can there by a non-traditional, post-liberal, 
critical theory that takes into account its historically situated interest? Can 
critical theory flee the deception of the Gorgias? 
Bubner sounds almost postmodern in his acceptance of the lesson 
from Horkheimer's and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment.* There is no 
ideology-free theory possible; critique can fulfill itself only in its negative 
dialectic by bringing out the untruth of any will to discourse.5 
Because he cannot conceive how communicative will to discourse 
could protect itself against will to power, Bubner portrays Habermas as a 
decisionist: critical reflection, even when it mediates knowledge and 
interests, can only claim but not legitimate its stance.6 Bubner picks up 
3Cf. 16-20,21-22,3<W5,103,165-70,188ff., 196-97, 204,209-12, 216. jQrgen 
Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Two Volumes, 
trans, by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Pres, 1984 and 1987). 
Hereafter abbreviated as TCAI and TCAII. 
^Translated by John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1987). 
5The motif of our beginnings in untruth, i.e., in the "absolute difference" of 
sin-consciousness, rather than in truth was first launched neither by 
Heidegger nor by Adorno nor by the postmodernists like Derrida and 
Foucault but by Kierkegaard against Hegel. See Kierkegaard's 
Philosophical Fragments/Johannes Climacus. Vol. 7 of Kierkegaard's 
Writings. Edited and trans, by Hong and Hong (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1985). 
^Habermas explicitly argues against decisionism and differentiates his 
position not only from Popper but also from Apel. On this see my 
"Habermas on Performative Contradiction and Communicative Action." 
New German Critique (forthcoming). 
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Habermas* distanciation from tradition, interest-free theory (still operative 
in the late Husserl's theme of the Hfeworld). But he argues that 
Habermas' version of critical theory lacks self-understanding: Habermas' 
appeal to language as the medium of maturity objectifies dialogue and 
projects theory into practice, but it fails to secure itself against power-
interest.7 In place of communicative action and dialogical rationality, 
Bubner proposes practically situated reason. 
Critical theory has so far failed to come up with a concept of 
reason which is, beyond the sphere of interests, internally related 
to concrete practice and would make a better connection between 
the realms which are so deeply divided in the Idealist conception 
(31). 
2. "Philosophy Is Its Time Comprehended in Thought" (1971, pp. 38-
61) asks how a reflective stance can be reconciled with time. If critique 
can't remain free from ideology, could the future guarantee an actual 
reconciliation of reality with thought? Bubner agrees that Adorno's 
negative dialectics allows for a reconciliation with time but pays the price 
of weakness in its positive critique of the present. Similarly hermeneutics, 
which claims to have overcome via its pre-reflective truth the split between 
theory and practice, also suffer weakness in its reflective opposition to the 
present. Both Adorno's negatived dialectics and Gadamer's claim to the 
universality of hermeneutical truth oppose the "bad" will to power at the 
cost of being at best aporetlc and at worst irrelevant as critiques. 
In this assessment of Adorno and Gadamer, Buhner's position comes 
close to Habermas' in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.9 They 
differ in the strategy for cure. Habermas will elaborate a distinction 
between the system and the Hfeworld to account for both the pathologies 
of communication and the resources against colonization of the Hfeworld 
by system.9 This distinction enables him to overcome the weakness of 
critical posture in Adorno's totalizing critique and in Gadamer's uncritical 
receptivity, on the one hand, and of the performative, i.e., not purely 
logical, self-contradiction in post-modern narratives, on the other hand. 
Bubner accepts what sound Uke a postmodern claim, i.ev that no ideology-
?For Habermas' refutation of Buhner's critique, see Habermas, TCA I, 85 
and 101. 
translated by Fred Lawrence (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1987). 
Hereafter abbreviated as PDM. See especially the lecture V. on Adorno's 
and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment. Again, verify this point with 
the weakness in Gadamer's reply to Derrlda in Dialogue and 
Deconstruction, op. cit. 
9Habermas, TCA II, 113-197. 
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free unmasking of deception is possible (53, 59). But in place of a 
differentiated account of distorted and undistorted action, he longs for 
6ome access to the immediacy of historical contingency, particular 
reflection, and concrete content (57-59). It is here that he will be 
vulnerable to a radically hermeneutical and deconstructionist genealogy 
of any naive presence in such immediacy. 
3. "Logic and Capital: On the Method of a 'Critique of Political 
Economy'" (1973, pp. 63-96) focuses on the paradox of critique and of its 
presuppositions.10 This essay highlights the interplay of Hegel's logic of 
contradiction and the role of mediation in Marx's critique of capitalism.11 
Marx learned from Hegel's Logic that method and content, theory and 
reality, can exhibit a unity only through negative telos, i.e., through an 
absence of unity. Marx neither prematurely leaps to praxis nor to a 
systematic elaboration of the communist future. The terms of Marxist 
critique like commodity, labor, capital, and money are developed through 
a mutually mediating relation of essence, illusion and appearance. 
Mediation surmounts the presuppositions of the beginnings of critique by 
defining all terms in mutual relations to one another. Critique operates via 
the logic of contradiction but never ventures into a vision beyond concrete 
historical analysis of capital. Because Marx presents only a negative 
vision, theory can't be projected outside of its immediate historical 
mediation.12 
4. "On the Role of Hermeneutics in the Philosophy of Science: A 
Contribution to a Discussion" (1973, pp. 97-112) discusses three senses of 
hermeneutics: first, a contingent coming to an understanding, second, the 
quasi-transcendental canons of interpretation and, third, hermeneutics as 
a philosophical theory. Bubner clears two common oversights: first, 
hermeneutics is not a special method for the human sciences. Here, he 
aligns himself with Gadamer against Dilthey. Second, hermeneutics is not 
practical philosophy. Bubner wants to differentiate his own position from 
both the hermeneutical claim to universality (Gadamer) and Habermas' 
communicative action. 
While Bubner is justified in setting hermeneutical truth apart from 
Aristotle's practical wisdom oriented to action, he does a poor job in 
critiquing Habermas' position (102-103). He objects rightly that there is a 
contradiction in Gadamer's claim to universality, on the one hand, and in 
his refusal to assume the status of a transcendental theory, on the other 
10Also 169-70,188-89,192. 
nCf.l23,136,143f.,153. 
^Compare this Hegelian-Marxist use of mediation with Lonergan's in my 
Mediation of Deconstruction: Bernard Lonergan's Method in Philosophy— 
the Argument from Human Operational Development (Lanham: UP A, 
1988). 
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(105-107). He Is correct that systems theory (Luhmann) and 
constructivism, while they manage to avoid Gadamer's dilemma of either 
falling into dogmatism or becoming Ineffective against sophistic 
deception, yield only an empty concept of a universal system. But he 
misses that Habermas' distinction between system and the lifeworld does 
full justice to this aporia within hermeneutics and in systems theory. 
Bubner needs this distinction in order to reconcile the quasi-
transcendental character of critique and the historical dimensions of time 
(107-112). 
5. "Dialectical Elements of a Logic of Discovery" (1973, pp. 113-145) is 
an excellent bridge between Continental debates of hermeneutics with 
critical theory and the Anglo-American philosophy of science. Bubner 
goes after Popper's decisionism (119, also 102) and the theory of truth 
based both on the notions of verisimilitude and progress. He also 
Incorporates into his critique of the post-empiricist philosophy of science 
(Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Toulmin) some of his preceding 
reflections on hermeneutics, the lifeworld, and the logic of presuppositions 
and contradictions. His reflective angle in this essay is a thoroughly 
Hegelian opposition between dialectic and positivism, verisimilitude and 
falsifkationism, the correspondence and the progressfvist notions of 
truth.13 
117. Practical philosophy and communicative action. 
6. "The Possibilities of Practical Reason" (1976, pp. 147-193), 7. "Norm 
and History" (1980, pp. 195-212), and 8. "Historical Action" (1984, pp. 213-
231) embody Buhner's shift to practical philosophy.14 I will critique 
Buhner's position from the angle of Habermas' theory of communicative 
action. 
First, because Bubner pushes Habermas closer to traditional theory 
(in Horkheimer's sense), he misses the fallibllist and mixed nature of 
ideality in communicative incommunicative ethics.15 This results, in the 
first place, in Buhner's mis-reading of the role that counterfactuals 
(communicative and ethical ideality) play in actual dialogue. In the 
second place, he completely bypasses Habermas' performative argument 
against decisionism (whether of Kant, Adorno, Popper or functionalism) 
and against postmodern totalizing critiques of reason. A case of this 
oversight is Buhner's exemplification of Feyerabend and Habermas as 
extremes of {nationalism and decisionist rationalism (204). 
^^Compare this with essay #3. 
1 4 On Buhner's full position, see Rudiger Bubner, Handlung, Sprache und 
Vernunft (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976). 
^Compare with the conclusion of Lecture V., on Adorno and Horkheimer, 
in Habermas, PDM 130. 
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Second, Bubner argues against counterfactual conditions of discourse 
and against Habermas' supposed decisionism (unjustified claims). But 
this argument from the possibility of the sophistic deception brings him 
closer to the post modern camp. But then, is not Buhner's uncritical 
return to Aristotle itself arbitrary? Even Alasdair Maclntyre says that while 
we need socially situated practical reason, we do not at present have 
cultural paradises that could ethically guide our action. Is not there a 
longing for presence in any uncritical return to the immediacy of action? 
Third, in essay 7, Bubner assigns false utopianism to Habermas, while 
he disregards a genuine place for Utopia in the theory of action. For all its 
brilliant analysis of idealism and Weber's functionalism, this essay suffers 
from the reduction of the difference between system and the Hfeworld. 
The thesis of practical rationality, which is to sublate both critical and 
hermeneutical reason, lacks the differentiated structure of 
communicative rationality.16 Habermas' position does justice to Bubner 
where the latter de-differentiates: Habermas does not deny the 
teleological component of action, but in addition he distinguishes strategic 
and communicative action. In reference to Bubner, he says: 
To avoid misunderstanding I would like to repeat that the 
communicative model of action does not equate action with 
communication. Language is a medium of communication that 
serves understanding, whereas actors, in coming to an 
understanding with one another so as to coordinate their actions, 
pursue their particular aims. In this respect the teleological 
structure is fundamental to all concepts of action.17 
Fourth, because Bubner operates with a monological mode of 
rationality and action, he is unable to target the Aristotelian mean 
between theory and practical philosophy. Habermas' distinction between 
communicative and strategic action, between the Hfeworld and system, is 
that theory-saving strategy which Bubner omits from among those he 
considers as a possibility of practical reason (217). The theory of 
communicative action allows both for the historicity qua the unthematized 
and pre-reflecHve Hfeworld and for its theoretical reconstruction-whether 
in direct discourse or in deciphering of distorted communication. With a 
dual model of action one doesn't run the danger of confusing 
reconstruction with reality (231). 
IV. Conclusion. All criticism notwithstanding, the book is extremely 
helpful to those interested in hermeneutics, critical theory, the philosophy 
1 6On Buhner's thesis, see 31,34,110,147,160,173,181,184ff., 209,215,217. 
17Habermas,TCAI,101. 
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of science and the Aristotelian renewal In ethics: First, Bubner belongs to 
those authors who deliberately and in a clear language bridge the chasm 
between the analytical camp and Continental thought. Secondly, in his 
use of the Hegelian-Marxist methodology, he brings socio-political 
concerns into the philosophy of science. Thirdly, his neo-Aristotelian 
critique of Habermas parallels recent communitarian critiques of 
deontological ethics such as Sandel's or Maclntyre's.18 Fourthly, his 
ambiguous passage between postmodern critiques of the ratio and the 
philosophy of presence, on the one hand, and a purely receptive 
hermeneutic and a purely formal critical theory, on the other hand, only 
illustrates the important character of the present debate between 
modernists and postmodernists.19 
Fifthly, I suggest that from Buhner's argument one should learn that 
neither the "good" will of Gadamer's hermeneutics nor Habermas' 
communicative ethics, on their own, can fully protect the will to discourse 
from emerging as the sophistic will to power. Still, neither an uncritical 
return from will to discourse to the immediacy of practical reason nor a 
postmodern evasion of responsible agency and accountable rationality will 
help. Rather, one needs to intensify will to discourse through an existential 
ethic of will against power.20 In place of Buhner's move to practical reason, 
one might substitute the feminist call for the concrete self in 
communicative ethics.21 The concrete self of needs complements the 
generalized intersubjective selfhood of communicative ethics. With this 
complement, it becomes clear that the possibility of undistorted 
communicative action resides not only in the performatively apprehended 
counterfactual condition of will to discourse but also in the existentially 
embodied counterfactual of will against power. Performative self-
1 ^Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982). Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue 
(Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). 
James Marsh, Post-Cartesian Meditations: An Essay In Dialectical 
Phenomenology (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988). See also 
Marsh's review-article of Caputo's Radical Hermeneutics, IPQ, XXVIII, 4 
(December 1988): 459-465. Marsh and Caputo, moderated by Merold 
Westphal, engaged in a symposium-debate on modernism and 
postmodernism in the* Spring of 1989 (Fordham University). This 
encounter will be edited and published by Fordham University Press. 
^Here I have in mind mainly Levians' essential verticality of the face-to-
face and Kierkegaard's indirect communication with will to power. 
2 1 C f . Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the 
Foundations of Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986). Seyla Benhaib and Drucilla Cornell, editors, Feminism as Critique 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Pres, 1987). 
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contradiction is the sophistic deception. Where communicative ethics 
can't fully protect Its will from power-interests, existential ethics provides 
that concrete but not decisionist counterfactual of will against power which 
Bubner sought in his uncritical return to the immediacy of practical 
reason. 
The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx. By David MacGregor. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984. Pp. viii + 312. $31.50. Reviewed 
by David A. Duquette, St. Norbert College. 
The author's main project, as stated in the introduction is to "read 
Marx on Hegelian terms," to demonstrate the implications of Hegel's 
Logic for reconstructing "social relationships and social structure," and to 
dispel the myth of Hegel the idealist which was perpetrated through 
Marx's misunderstanding of the "Hegelian Idea" (p. 3). While MacGregor 
does a great deal to make these theses plausible, there is another thesis 
which he assumes throughout the book and this is that we must also read 
Hegel in light of Marx. (On p. 239 he quotes favorably from Althussen "...it 
is impossible to understand Hegel without having thoroughly studied and 
understood 'Capital'"). MacGregor seems to want to show that, despite 
Marx's critique of Hegel, when properly understood these two thinkers 
have little, if any, significant opposition between them-and I suspect that 
this leads to the contrary extreme of those who have put these thinkers in a 
completely antithetical relation. The danger in reading Marx back into 
Hegel is that the significant differences between the two thinkers are 
either ignored or underplayed. 
There is little doubt that the dialectical character of "ideation" (being-
for-self as externalization and retrieval in a progressive development) is 
Marx's legacy from Hegel. But MacGregor speaks of "ideation" and 
"revolutionizing practice" in the same breath. If by "revolutionizing 
practice" in Hegel he means that the process of ideation involves intrinsic 
qualitative transformation resulting in progress and novelty, then use of 
the term is fair. However, if he really means to include as well the Marxian 
conception of radical critique and revolutionary praxis, then I believe we 
have a distorted Hegel as a result. In this critical review I wish to consider 
MacGregor's specific arguments for his position. In particular, I will 
discuss his view of Hegel's critique of capital, theory of class struggle, and 
conception of the transition to communism. 
MacGregor's interpretation of Hegel's critique of capitalism, and civil 
society generally, rests in part on the thesis that Hegel has something 
resembling Marx's theory of surplus value. This point is anticipated in 
Chapter 6 with the claim (p. 173) that for Hegel "the relation of contract 
involves an element of contradiction," suggesting a critique of the 
"abstract" freedom of contract, and then arguing that for Hegel "the 
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worker and the capitalist form an essential, if antagonistic, unity" (p. 180). 
This latter point seems to be deduced from the requirements of dialectical 
logic rather than from Hegel's specific social analyses. MacGregor makes 
the quite remarkable assertion that "for Hegel as well as for Marx, the 
dialectical movement of modern society will eventually result in a real 
unity of the business class where the opposition and distinction between 
capitalist and worker disappear" (p. 181), again apparently as a deduction 
of dialectical logic. 
Next, MacGregor comes up with an Hegelian critique of capitalist 
private property, and correspondingly a critique of wage labor, on the basis 
of what appears to be a labor theory of property. The basic idea is that 
property is an expression of the free will through externalizing labor, but 
since in wage labor the product of labor is possessed by someone other 
than the laborer, the result is solely an abstract freedom—"everyone must 
have property" but not everyone receives the fruits of their labor. 
Moreover, since ownership of a thing is simply a function of the constant 
use of it, and since the worker is constantly using the means of production, 
it follows that the means of production are properly the (social) property of 
the workers, rather than the private property of the capitalists. The 
contradictory relationship between, on the one hand, the ideality of 
productive labor resulting in the externality of the means of production 
and of the product and, on the other hand, the abstract ownership of 
capital, MacGregor refers to with Hegel's term "the insanity of personality" 
(pp. 1900. Moreover, he argues that because of the inequality in the 
contract between the worker and capitalist (subsistence wages vs property 
as renewable source) this sort of contract is merely formal and exploitative 
in a manner similar to the alienation of surplus value analyzed by Marx. 
The conclusion drawn is not only that Hegel has a "corrosive critique of 
capitalist private property" (p. 190) but also that the resolution of the 
contradiction between the worker and the capitalist for Hegel requires a 
"necessary, because rational, transition to common ownership of the 
means of production" (p. 194). 
One cannot but find this interpretation to be extremely forced. In 
particular, there are problems with the glosses on a number of the 
paragraphs on property and contract in Hegel's Philosophy of Right 
(hereafter, PR). To begin with, Par. 62 is not at all aimed at capitalism but 
rather at feudalism, and Hegel's charge of the "insanity of personality" 
applies to the relation of overlord and vassal. But what justifies the 
interpolation of this discussion with reference to the relation of capitalist 
and worker? Are we to simply presume that the structure of the relations 
in feudalism and capitalism are isomorphic? Even Marx would deny that. 
Indeed, what distinguishes wage labor from slavery and serfdom is that the 
former is free labor as a result of contract. So the conclusion that 
capitalism for Hegel violates the principle that constant use is the basis of 
property ignores the fact that beyond taking possession and making use, 
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alienation (Entausserung) of labor is a perfectly legitimate process. Not 
only can 1 alienate my property strictly speaking, but also "{slingle 
products of my particular physical and mental skill and of my power to act 
I can alienate to someone else and I can give him the use of my abilities 
for a restricted period, because, on the strength of this restriction, my 
abilities acquire an external relation to the totality and universality of my 
being" (PR, par. 67). 
MacGregor distinguishes between "formal" and "real" contract (p. 192) 
as a way of showing that the capitalist exchange relation is alienated (in the 
sense of estranged or entfremden) for Hegel—when this is not Hegel's 
intention here at all! By a merely formal contract in par. 76 Hegel means a 
gift as opposed to a contract of exchange. Clearly the worker does not 
provide his labor power as a gift to the capitalist but as an exchange for 
wages, and yet MacGregor claims that since the wages represent only 
subsistence, and not property as such, "the worker gets only a part of the 
value he or she creates; the capitalist pockets the rest" (p. 192). But where 
does Hegel say that the only sorts of proper exchange involve strictly 
property in kind? He does say, and MacGregor quotes this on p. 192, that 
"what thus remains identical throughout .as the property implicit in the 
contract is distinct (my emphasis) from the external things whose owners 
alter when the exchange is made" (PR, par. 77). Hegel's discussion of 
laesio enormis in the remark to par. 77 is in no way aimed at the wage 
worker but is simply a general observation about the annulling of 
obligations when the values exchanged are extremely disparate. 
Instead of taking Hegel's discussions in their proper context the 
author gives Marxian readings of them and concludes not only that 
Hegel's "critique" of capitalism bears resemblance to Marx's theory of 
surplus value but that Hegel really was the first to come up with the theory 
of value exploitation! Ultimately, Hegel's solution to this problem turns 
out to be virtually identical to Marx's, i.e., the "transition to common 
ownership of the means of production" (p. 194), a conclusion drawn, again, 
only by giving an amazingly liberal interpretation to the remarks at PR par. 
62. 
In Chapter 7, "The External Capitalist State," MacGregor elaborates 
on the Hegelian solution to the alienation of labor by showing that the 
transition in Hegel between civil society and the political state is, in effect, 
the same as the transition to communism. Hegel's civil or bourgeois 
society, the "state external," Is, as he puts it, "precisely 'the modern 
representative State' described by Marx as 'a committee for managing the 
common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie'" (p. 195). Right off this 
comparison is misleading since Marx was thinking of the state as including 
those specifically political institutions which for Hegel are not part of the 
"external state." In any case, MacGregor wants to show how "the external 
capitalist state is simply a 'stage of division,' a point of transition to a much 
different social order" (pp. 195-96). But just what does it mean to say that a 
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"new civilization" is being heralded? Apparently he things that Marx's 
idea of transition to a higher form of society is what Hegel had in mind 
(despite his saying on p. 253 that "the order of the categories in the 
Philosophy of Right has little to do with historical succession") and by the 
end of Chapter 7, in analyzing the relation between civil society and the 
state, he explicitly claims that "Hegel is convinced that the corporation is 
the means through which society will pass into the rational state where 
common ownership of the means of production by the associated 
producers will prevail" (p. 235). 
Notice that this conclusion means that the distinction between civil 
society and the state is no longer just a strictly conceptual distinction of 
moments within the totality of ethical life but is now a temporal distinction: 
civil society paves the way historically for the state as a succeeding form of 
social order. I find this interpretation of Hegel simply astonishing! How 
can Hegel be providing such a temporalized dialectic when in the preface 
to PR he explicitly says that he is not constructing the state (as totality) as it 
ought to be but aiming to "comprehend what is" (p. 11); when he says 
"those who try to justify things on historical grounds confound an origin in 
external circumstances with one in concept" (p. 17); and when he claims 
that "(alctually, therefore, the state as such is not so much the result as the 
beginning. It is within (my emphasis) the state that the family is first 
developed into civil society, and it is the idea of the state itself which 
disrupts itself into these two moments" (par. 256r). Hegel's division of the 
subject of the Philosophy of Right given on pp. 35-36 is clearly a 
conceptual, philosophic division, not an external or historical one. 
The author's discussion of the fundamental aspects of civil society, the 
competitive self-seeking and the rational universallzation, appears 
basically sound. However, I wonder if he is clear about which aspects of 
civil society promote which ends. His references simply to the external 
capitalist state, when speaking either of its rationality or irrationality, seem 
to blur at times the distinction within civil society between the system of 
needs and the system of justice (see bottom of p. 201). Also, I think that he 
reads too much into Hegel's notion of the business class when he posits 
within it a class struggle between capitalist and worker leading to a 
dialectical unity of the two in the rational "communist" state (pp. 205-07). 
While Hegel does see struggle as part of the process of Bildung it is not 
clear why this has to be given a Marxist description. Moreover, how can 
MacGregor say both that "(u)niversal concerns are unknown to the 
individual in bourgeois society who looks after only purely personal and 
selfish interests" and also say that "(tlhe product of education under 
capitalism, then, is the social individual" (p. 214)? In the subsection of 
Chapter 7, "Cm Law and Justice," he acknowledges that the capitalist and 
worker share the values of law, liberty, and freedom, and on p. 220 he notes 
that Marx concurs on the desire for law and liberty. Generally, however, 
MacGregor seems to waver on the extent to which rationality is possessed 
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Immanently in bourgeois society. At any rate, it is clear that for his Hegel 
there is not enough rationality in civil society to prevent its historical 
demise. 
Another troublesome point has to do with the discussion of the 
Korporation in Hegel. In spite of the acknowledgement of Hegel's 
Corporation as "a democratic political organization with direct links to the 
state" (p. 233) MacGregor insists that "Hegel deliberately defines the 
corporation as a contradictory organization representative of the opposing 
interests of capitalists and workers" (p. 234). But even if one were to 
acknowledge that the joint stock company is one example of a Corporation 
in Hegel's sense, where do we get the democratic political organization 
between capitalists and workers? The relation between management and 
labor is hardly like the "second family" which, for Hegel, the corporation 
produces for its members. MacGregor says that "Hegel, of course, is not 
referring to the actual reality of the corporation, but to its historical 
tendencies, tendencies reflected, however inadequately, in the modern 
corporation with its job protection and mobility schemes, retirement and 
health plans, and so forth" (p. 232). But do these social gains, which result 
from concessions made due to collective bargaining, really point to 
democratical tendencies in the modern corporation? Anyway, it seems 
that Hegel thought the Corporation would be managed effectively only on 
the basis of an overriding common interest, which is rather difficult if the 
Corporation, by including the capitalist and wage worker, reflects the 
antagonism between classes (Cf. PR, par. 288). 
Finally, I am surprised that, since MacGregor claims the political state 
In Hegel is essentially the rational communist society, there is such little 
space in the book devoted to analysis of the political constitution of the 
state (only on pp. 255-59 of the last chapter). He does say that for Hegel 
"monarchy, constitutional or otherwise, will have no place in the rational 
state" (p. 258). However, this conflicts with Hegel's claim in PR, par. 280r 
that it is the Understanding which cannot comprehend how the monarch 
represents the unity of the Idea. (Also see the addition on p. 288 of Knox.) 
In PR, pars. 278-281 MacGregor seems to select out Hegel's mention of the 
negative moment of the monarchy without also acknowledging the 
positive moment and the fact that, above all, Hegel explicitly says that the 
monarch is an "absolutely decisive moment of the whole (of the 
constitution]" (par. 281), and therefore is a rational manifestation of the 
Idea. Marx's critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right is given no substantial 
discussion in the book, but in light of the conclusions drawn about Hegel's 
own critical view of monarchy 1 suspect MacGregor might hold that Hegel 
would find Marx's critique of constitutional monarchy quite acceptable (at 
least, this is the logical outcome of reading Marx back into Hegel). While 
MacGregor gives recognition to the role of the universal class of civil 
servants in Hegel's polity, one wonders why this class would not itself 
eventually "wither away" once the network of representation in future 
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political constituencies "will be transformed through a process of struggle 
and conflict into organs of direct democracy and worker's control" (p. 256). 
But, in any event, does the idea of direct democracy really square with 
Hegel's critical comments on public opinion in PR, par. 318? 
Apart from the zeal and determination with which the author pursues 
Hegel the "communist," I think his conclusion about the rational state in 
Hegel are the result of certain misunderstandings about Hegel's Logic 
and its relation to actuality. First, while he acknowledges that for Hegel the 
dialectal Aufhebung is an identity which preserves differentiation, the 
ways in which he appeals to the Logic to support the "notion of the unity of 
the capitalist with the worker" (p. 180), especially as it relates to the critique 
of capitalism and the socialization of the means of production, seems to 
overplay the unity at the expense of the differences. Second, he seems to 
handle the relation between ideality and reality in a manner such that the 
difference between the two is not just the difference between the Concept 
(Begriff) and its instantiation in space and time, but also the difference 
between instantiation in the (ideal) future versus the (real) present. It is on 
this basis that he turns Hegel's Philosophy of Right into a sort of Hegelian 
"Critique .of the Philosophy of Right" But this is to do exactly what Hegel 
said he was not doing, i.e., philosophizing about the state as it ought to be. 
Third, while one can agree that "the Philosophy of Right must be seen as a 
concrete application of dialectic method" (p. 180) care must be taken that 
the method is not utilized such that form is Imposed in an arbitrary way 
upon the content. (Marx, of course, did think that Hegel was guilty of 
logical a priorism and it seems fair to say that Marx was wrong about this. 
In fact, Marx's own vision of the rational society was somewhat a priori 
given his sweeping dismissal of many of the important rational functions of 
bourgeois society, and more generally of the role of social and political 
institutionalization overall.) 
Nonetheless, MacGregor requires that even with Hegel bourgeois 
society must be historically (and not just conceptually) transcended 
because of the a priori requirements of dialectical Logic. Isn't this "unity, of 
the capitalist and work" which presumably points to the future society, and 
which Hegel himself nowhere uncovers in his concrete analysis of 
bourgeois society (and which, in his historical situation, would hardly be 
discoverable even by anyone else), precisely a result of imposing the form 
of dialectical synthesis upon the content of political economy in an a priori 
manner? 
To claim in a Leninist view that the categories of the Logic are 
specifically social categories, as if they are uniquely intended as means for 
deducing a particular conception of the social ideal, is to foster a 
somewhat ideological approach in their application to reality. The main 
defect of MacGregor's book is that in attempting to make Hegel into a 
"communist" the author has given us a Hegel who speaks primarily,and 
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rather ideologically, to the future instead of the Hegel who reflects, more 
retrospectively, on the rationality of the present. 
Theory and Politics: Studies in the Development of Critical Theory 
By Helmut Dubiel (Trans. Benjamin Gregg) Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985. 
207 pp. Reviewed by George A. Trey, Loyola University of Chicago. 
Since its appearance In English translation in 1985, Helmut Dubiel's 
Theory and Politics: Studies in the Development of Critical Theory 
(originally published in 1978 as Wissenschaftsorganisation und politische 
Erfahrung: Studien zur fruhen Kritischen Theorie) has been widely 
reviewed and its influence on critical theory in the United States is firmly 
established. As such, I will not spend a great deal of time surveying its 
content. Rather, I will briefly comment on the spirit in which it was written 
and outline its basic structure. I will proceed with several critical remarks 
before concluding with some suggestions as to how this book can be 
appropriated in a theoretically and politically relevant fashion. 
Dubiel characterizes his assessment of the development of critical 
theory in contrast to the poles represented by partisan support and 
adversary attack: the former accounts for its subject matter as a 
continuously fruitful venture, the latter as a fragmentary and ultimately ill 
conceived project. In contrast, Dubiel states his agenda as such: "The 
program of this book will, on the contrary, be to define the continuity of the 
theory's development from 1930 to 1945 precisely in terms of the 
discontinuity of its subject matter. We grasp its entire development as the 
reflective expression of a historical experience" (3). His aim then, in line 
with the most fundamental views of Max Horkheimer, is to show that 
theory Is immanently historical-that to understand the course of 
theoretical development within the Frankfurt Circle it is necessary to 
understand it as, and in relation to, a series of historical phenomena. The 
book is divided into two major sections. The first deals with what Dubiel 
delimits as the three main phases in the development of critical theory, 
discussing each in terms of "Historical and Political Experience", Theory 
of the Theory-Praxis Relation" and Theoretical Position". The second 
offers a more detailed account of the Frankfurt Circle's organizational 
structure and project coordination at the inception of Horkheimer's 
directorship of the Institute for Social Research. 
Dubiel tags the first phase (1930-1937) "Materialism". The driving 
force during this period was an effort to develop a theory of 
interdisciplinary science as an extension of Marxist dialectical 
materialism. Three prominent features of the political landscape upon 
which critical theory established its footing were determinate: a waxing 
disillusionment with existing socialist parties in Germany (which were 
becoming increasingly dogmatic and jargony); a waning sympathy for the 
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social-political program of the Soviet Union; and the ambiguous 
predicament of assessing the rise of fascism in Europe from an internal 
perspective. The most serious question prompted by this situation 
pertained to the relationship between theory and practice. If the 
proletariat becomes categorically suspect as the source and bearer of 
revolutionary theory, what will take its place? For the prime movers of 
critical theory this translated into a withdrawal (albeit tentative at this 
point) into the alcoves of meta-theory. Their main concern was to 
reformulate Marxist materialism, with the aid of contemporary social 
science, such that it could accommodate and account for the rapidly 
changing conditions faced in pre-war Europe. This was attempted with a 
view to the reformulation of a tense theory-practice dynamic. 
The second main phase (from 1937-1940) is labeled by Dublel "Critical 
Theory" and was inaugurated by Horkheimer's seminal essay Traditional 
and Critical Theory". Fundamental to the Circle's theoretical work during 
this period was the influence of further disintegration within German 
socialist parties, increased abuses in the USSR and the flourish of fascism 
that was sweeping Europe. As Dubiel points out, this cast serious doubts 
on the viability of Marxist theory in any orthodox sense. Rather than 
scrapping Marxism, however, the circle re-tooled It in such a way that the 
rise of fascism could be understood as the product of a highly organized, 
centrally administered form of capitalism. The thesis maintains that 
fascism is a political consequence of the reproduction of capital in the 
developed monopolistic period:" (46). The project that emerged was a 
rigorous, internally critical theory of the relationship between philosophy, 
science and the material conditions of human existence. Modeled after 
Marx's Critique of Political Economy, the idea of "Critical Theory" was now 
formalized. As Dubiel summarizes: "Thus critical theory is the name for 
the Circle's theoretical-political orientation, a mark of belonging to the 
tradition of Marxist theory, and-significantly-the expression of the claim 
of representing the real substance of the authentic tradition" (61). 
Dubiel terms the final phase of critical theory (1940-1945) The 
Critique of Instrumental Reason". During this time the full force of 
fascism, Stalinism and the collapse of hope in the proletariat was 
absorbed, internalized and reflected in the work of the Frankfurt circle. 
Dubiel assesses the impact as follows: "According to this judgment, the 
political function of critical theory could now consist only in reflecting upon 
the determinants of this disintegration" (69). In brief, the practice of 
theory became strictly negative. And negate it did; the dark, landmark 
work by Horkheimer and Adorno—Dialectic of Enlightenment—traces a 
gloomy history of the logic of western rationality from Odysseus to Hitler 
that leaves little room for hope. As Dubiel, not to mention Habermas, 
points out, this locks theory into a state of cynical political quietism— 
effectively bringing an end to the project as it was initially conceived. 
Marxism loses its force; science Is always already co-opted by the 
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bureaucratically structured mechanisms of big capital; and political 
discourse within the "revolutionary" classes becomes little more than 
mindless chatter. As such, critical theory is reduced to abstract 
philosophical lamentations on the present condition and the lengthy chain 
of events that provide its foundation. 
Apparently Dubiel feels that the way to determine where critical 
theory went wrong is to return to the first phase and reconstruct it more 
meticulously. This in fact is what he does in the second major section of 
the book. Here the foundations of critical theory are viewed in terms of 
the hierarchies of power, networks of influences and the programmatic 
strategies that follow from the unique web of relations that compose the 
Frankfurt Circle. Horkheimer is located neatly in the center of all this (see 
diagram on page 157) as in Dubiel's view it was his directives that 
formulated the Circle's projects. While Dubiel leaves us with little more 
than documentation-nothing in the way of insight or vision-his careful 
scholarship is commendable as are the exhuasitve bibliography and 
relevant notes that accompany the main body of the text. 
Putting aside the rigor of its analysis and the merits of its 
reconstructions, Dubiel's presentation is problematic in several respects. 
First, the picture that he paints of critical theory's development, if 
illustrated graphically, would look like an irrigation system. The central 
position, or main stream of thought, would be firmly stamped with the 
name Horkheimer. The tributaries would be labeled with the names of 
various figures that followed the directions of critical theory's patriarch. 
This is most telling in Dubiel's discussion of the dis-in teg rated third 
period. Without a programmatic essay by the Circle's Rector, critical 
theory falls into discontinuous patterns of detached reflection. 
This model, while interesting in many respects, downplays the 
internally dialectical tenor of critical theory that marked it from the 
earliest phase. Testimony to this is provided by Dubiel's documentation of 
the rich series of correspondences that took place between various 
participants in the Circle's theoretical and political development. Further, 
this picture is not accepted by a number of important figures in critical 
theory. As no less than Herbert Marcuse puts it (in a discussion with 
Jtirgen Habermas when he is asked about the independence of direction 
and research tasks that Dubiel suggests): "No, that's an unthinkable split, 
a completely undialectical split between research and representation. It 
really wasn't practiced at the institute. It is not at all the case that 
Horkheimer was responsible for philosophical stimualtion and integration 
and his colleagues represented his thoughts. Not at all. Every one of the 
colleagues shared the area here reserved .for Horkheimer!" (Telos 38, p. 
128.) As such, one of the most remarkable aspects of critical theory-its 
commitment to theory formation through internally reflexive self-critique-
-is nominalized. 
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A second problem crops up when Dubiel's own relation to Theorie" is 
considered. In his effort to document the Frankfurt Circle's development 
as objectively as possible he abstracts himself from any commitment to 
the development of theory. The passion and fervor that drove the thought 
tradition that he provides an account of is completely absent in his 
presentation. This is not a work in critical theory but simply a chart of its 
rise and decline. Effectively, critical theory is rendered as little more than 
a museum piece-a relic to study. While it could be argued that this is the 
logical consequnce of the third phase, I will suggest momentarily why this 
is not necessarily so and how this book, in spite of its disengaged approach, 
can contribute importantly to the revitalization of critical theory as an 
active intellectual, as well as political, force. 
Finally, the second major section of the book—"Dialectical 
Presentation and Interdisciplinary Research"-ls attached with no obvious 
purpose to the historical narrative of the first. Had it been a bonaflde 
analysis of the circumstances between 1930 and 1937, with reflection on the 
alternative routes that theory might have followed given those conditions, 
it would have genuinely contributed to the ongoing task of developing an 
adequate critical theory of society. As it stands, however, section II is 
merely an awkward appendage to I, often simply repeating, rather than 
building upon, points already established. 
In spite of these shortcomings, Dubiel's book does contribute 
significantly to the development of critical theory. While detached and 
inspiring (much like the sciences that the early versions of critical theory 
hoped to dialectically transform), Theory and Politics provides a carefully 
thought through schematization of the methods, projects and visions of 
critical theory in its earliest stages. The model that Dubiel reconstructs 
offers a source pool of material upon which further attempts at 
formulating a practical-theoretical course of study can reflect upon and 
critically receive. Without the sense of precedence provided by Dubiel's 
book (along with numerous other Important works in the history of critical 
theory) critical theory would likely culminate in a frustrated dead end. 
When viewed within the context of an urgent pursuit of theoretical and 
political objectives this work can serve as a well spring, rejuvenating the 
ongoing projects that have their roots in the work of the Frankfurt Circle. 
As Dubiel states in an unusually visionary momement: "Our interests in 
reconstructing this context is not an interest in group biography or 
historiography, even though our goal of an exemplary, in-depth analysis 
can be realized only by means of the greatest possible historical and 
philological knowledge of the case as offered by the most recent research 
on the literature and documentation. Instead, this investigation is 
presented as a case study that, by drawing upon material dealing with the 
history of science, considers the methodological and organizational 
conditions necessary for interdisciplinary resarch" (127). 
